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 Starting with Wittgenstein, by Chon TEJEDOR, LONDON: CONTINUUM
 International Publishing Group, 201 1; pp. 183.
 Starting with Wittgenstein is part of Continuum's "Starting with ..." se-
 ries, which aims to give easily understandable introductions to the ideas of the
 most influential philosophers. Chon Tejedor's book begins with a short intro-
 duction in which Wittgenstein's life is very briefly outlined. The main part of
 the book is divided into two parts. The first part, The Earlier Wittgenstein , con-
 cerns the theory Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
 The focus of the second part, The later Wittgenstein , is on his Philosophical In-
 vestigations. Every part consists of three chapters, and ends with a short con-
 clusion in which the most important points are briefly summarized in just a few
 sentences. In addition, the content of most subsections of the chapters are fol-
 lowed by a summary.
 Part One begins with the chapter Language and Logic . Some basic ide-
 as of Wittgenstein's early philosophy are explained there. Tejedor starts with
 the distinction between Wittgenstein's notions of sentence and proposition,
 the importance he saw in logical analysis, his distinction between sense and
 meaning, and his use of truth-tables, because they "[...] are of fundamental
 importance to our later understanding of some of Wittgenstein's most intrigu-
 ing insights: insights on the pictoriality of propositions and thoughts, on the
 self, on ethics, and, ultimately, on the status of the Tractatus itself' [p. 7].
 The second chapter Thoughts and the Self is dedicated to Wittgenstein's
 view on the relation between thoughts and propositions, his picture theory of
 language and his arguments against solipsism. His demarcation between
 thoughts and propositions is explained as follows. A thought is, according to
 Wittgenstein, a mental picture representing a possible state of the world that
 cannot be perceived by our senses. Propositions are also representations of a
 possible state, but they are made up of words, which can be perceived by our
 senses. Tejedor goes on to explain why Wittgenstein argues against Bertrand
 Russell's view of a simple thinking self. Wittgenstein believed in minds that
 are combinations of thoughts, because only this notion of the self is consistent
 with the aims and methods of psychology. The chapter closes with a compre-
 hensible commentary on Wittgenstein's argument against solipsism. The solip-
 sistic position is attacked by being established on the wrong assumption that
 selves are simple.
 Part One ends with the chapter Logic and Ethics. In this chapter, Tejedor
 initially analyzes Wittgenstein's critique of traditional ethics and the influence
 of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy on his philosophy. The most important -
 and often repeated - statement in this chapter is that "[...] the point of the
 Tractatus is an ethical one [...]" [p. 96], although it does not establish an ethical
 theory. Tejedor takes the view that Wittgenstein tries to clarify concepts with the
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 aim of getting a better understanding of the world and concluding that we
 cannot talk about ethics.
 Language and Use , the first chapter of Part Two, begins with some re-
 marks on Wittgenstein's life between 1921 and 1929. Tejedor stresses that the
 later Wittgenstein pursued in his Philosophical Investigations the same aims as
 in his Tractatus , but he changed the methods by which he wanted to achieve
 them. It is emphasized that Wittgenstein denied some of the very basic ideas of
 his first major work, including "[...] the view that concepts have fixed essences
 and the view that logical analysis is central to conceptual clarification" [p. 107].
 After explaining this radical change of mind upon giving up the idea of the log-
 ical independence of elementary propositions, an analysis of Wittgenstein's no-
 tion of family resemblance follows. He introduces this notion because he is
 convinced that most concepts, along with the concept of language, do not have
 a clear and precise essence. Therefore, logical analysis is useless. We have to
 look at how a word is used in ordinary language, if we want to specify a con-
 cept. Wittgenstein's picture of language, which he developed in his Tractatus ,
 is shown to be identical with St Augustine's view. Thereafter, Tejedor exam-
 ines very accurately how Wittgenstein used in his Investigations language-
 games to demonstrate the impossibility of the theory he defended in his first
 major work. The chapter concludes with an outline of Wittgenstein's new view
 on meaning and his central assumption that the meaning of a word is the way in
 which it is used in a language-game: "For the later Wittgenstein meaning is
 use" [p. 135].
 Tejedor checks an objection against this assumption in the fifth chapter,
 Rules and Meaning , and meets it with the reasons Wittgenstein presented
 against the objection. Wittgenstein's view on meaning may face the objection
 that meaning is something existing in our minds: The correct use of a word
 does not guarantee the understanding of its meaning, because a person may
 use a word appropriately by just parroting. Therefore, the meaning of a word
 is the rule according to which it is used. But although rules are a central and
 important element of language-games, "[...] there is no essence in common to
 all game-playing, just as there is no essence in common to all language. [...]
 Some instances of game-playing are governed by rules; others not" [p. 140].
 Chapter six, Sensations and Private Languages , deals both with Witt-
 genstein's definition of a private language and the confusions this notion
 causes. Tejedor reconstructs Wittgenstein's critique of Descartes' belief that
 anyone's sensations cannot be known by someone else. Part Two ends with
 the insight that "[t]he Philosophical Investigations marks a clear break from
 the Tractatus " [p. 174] and emphasizes Wittgenstein's conviction that phi-
 losophical problems arise from confused concepts.
 Starting with Wittgenstein is proof that Tejedor is more than familiar
 with the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is remarkable that the book
 contains mainly quotes from the two major works of Wittgenstein and only
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 very few from secondary literature. This seems to me an interesting way to
 introduce beginners to Wittgenstein's philosophy, and undoubtedly it is a
 valuable preparation for the first reading of any of Wittgenstein's books.
 Tejedor's book is a very useful introduction to the philosophy of Witt-
 genstein: basic concepts of his works are explained in a simple manner, and
 central hypotheses are analyzed in a way that allows first-year students to fol-
 low the ideas behind them. The individual summaries of the sections, chapters,
 and of the two main parts of the book make it easier to get an overview of the
 book's content and Wittgenstein's claims. This will be very helpful for begin-
 ners, even if it may be a bit too much for experts in Wittgenstein. Nonetheless,
 it seems to me that certain parts of the book might be a support for people who
 are already familiar with Wittgenstein's ideas. Since the aim of the book is to
 give an introduction into the philosophy of Wittgenstein, it cannot be seen as a
 shortcoming.
 A small deficiency is that the book takes little account of Wittgenstein's
 philosophical roots and the influence his theories had on the development of
 20th century philosophy. "[T]he book introduces the major thinkers whose work
 proved influential in the development of Wittgenstein's thought, including
 Frege, Russell and Schopenhauer", is written on the blurb of the book, but this
 is at best true for Schopenhauer's influence and partially for Russell's, whereas
 Frege's name cannot even be found in the index. In the Introduction , Tejedor
 claims there is "[...] no doubt that Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy is
 extraordinary", but unfortunately the impact his ideas had on the philosophy of
 recent decades are not considered in the book. Of course, it would too much to
 ask from the book to present an analysis of the full extent of the influence
 Wittgenstein's ideas had on his followers and opponents, but the book awakens
 such expectations in some of its parts. Nevertheless, despite these minor flaws,
 Starting with Wittgenstein has fully achieved its goal and is very well suited to
 acquaint those who are interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy with the basic
 ideas of his two major writings.
 Manuel Lechthaler
 Department of Philosophy
 University of Otago
 117 Union St East , Dunedin 9054, New Zealand
 E-mail: m. Iech85 @gmx. net
 Física social , de AUGUSTE COMTE , ESTUDIO PRELIMINAR, TRADUCCIÓN Y
 edición de Juan R. Goberna Falque, Madrid, Ediciones Akal, 2012,
 1295 pp.
 Podría parecer paradójico reseñar como novedad la publicación de un
 autor clásico fallecido en 1857. En este caso, sin embargo, la traducción al
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